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jkolstad@wharton.upenn.eduuThe classic welfare analysis of firm entry involves a tradeoff between the benefits 
of competition and losses from rent seeking.  The benefits of competition are 
straightforward; the rent-seeking losses stem from the fact that part of an entrant’s profit 
is generated by stealing business from incumbent firms.  These transferred profits are not 
a social benefit, but the fixed outlays associated with entry represent a social cost.  Under 
these conditions, Gregory Mankiw and Michael Whinston (1986) show that excessive 
entry is likely. This standard model, however, does not address a key feature of many 
industries: the inelastic supply of certain factors of production, such as labor or land. We 
consider the impact of such constrained inputs on the welfare economics of entry by 
studying hospital entry into the provision of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) 
surgery.  CABG represents a natural case study for two reasons: the supply of cardiac 
surgeons is roughly fixed in the short term and the quality of output is at least partially 
measurable.  
With imperfectly supplied inputs, entry is less likely to be excessive than when 
inputs are more elastically supplied.  A more subtle implication of constrained inputs 
relates to the level of quality at which firms will enter.  In our setting, a surgeon may be a 
leader in the field or a novice, and when a hospital decides to enter the CABG market, it 
must decide which surgeons to employ. More generally, the decision about quality 
depends on the supply elasticity of factor inputs.  Entry is likely to occur at high quality if 
high-quality labor is in relatively inelastic supply.  In such a setting, oligopsonistic firms 
will ration use of high-quality workers prior to free entry, and new entrants will find such 
workers valuable.  In contrast, entry will occur at lower quality if the supply of high-
quality labor is relatively elastic.     2
To examine these implications empirically, we consider CABG entry by hospitals 
in Pennsylvania, which in 1996 eliminated its certificate of need (CON) policy that 
restricted entry by hospitals into expensive clinical programs, such as CABG.
1  Repeal of 
CON was associated with significant hospital entry into CABG—from 1996 to 2003 the 
number of hospitals providing this service in Pennsylvania increased from 43 to 63.
2  We 
rely on this growth to estimate the welfare effects of entry in this market. 
The overall volume of CABG in Pennsylvania remained roughly flat for several 
years after CON repeal. We find that, as new programs entered the market, volume 
shifted from incumbent programs to entrants and from lower- to higher-quality surgeons.  
The repeal of CON in Pennsylvania thus appears to have had a salutary effect on the 
market for cardiac surgery by directing more volume to better doctors and increasing 
access to treatment.  Offsetting this benefit are the fixed costs paid by new entrants of 
about $13 million per program.  On its own, the benefit of reduced mortality from the 
increased use of high-quality surgeons roughly offsets the fixed costs associated with free 
entry. Given our conservative assumptions and the fact that these estimates do not capture 
other gains from the repeal of CON (e.g., reductions in morbidity due to the reallocation 
of patients or reductions in administrative costs), our results suggest entry due to the 
repeal of CON was approximately welfare neutral. 
                                                 
1 CON regulation has been studied in some detail (see Christopher J. Conover and Frank A. Sloan, 1998).  
The primary focus of this literature, however, has been on the cost implications of restricted entry.  A 
smaller number of recent papers in both the health economics and medical literatures examine the impact of 
CON regulation on clinical quality (e.g., Vivian Ho, 2006; Verdi J. DiSesa et al., 2006; Robert H. Jones, 
2006), as we do in this study. 
2 Our data include an additional hospital that entered the market in late 2003 performing a total of 31 
surgeries by the end of 2003. Because entry occurred well after the repeal of CON—and we observe only a 
very small number of procedures from that hospital in our data—we exclude this facility from the 
remaining analysis.    3
Our paper is structured as follows.  Section I discusses entry decisions in the 
presence of fixed factors of production.  Section II describes the cardiac surgery setting.  
Section III presents our results concerning the impact of repealing CON, Section IV 
estimates the welfare implications of this repeal, and Section V concludes.   
 
I. FIRM ENTRY IN MARKETS WITH CONSTRAINED INPUTS 
In general, firm entry into a market increases welfare by lowering prices (and 
thereby increasing volume) or increasing product variety (Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, 1977; Spence, 1980; Roger W. Koenker and Martin K. Perry, 1981; Mankiw and 
Whinston, 1986). These gains, however, come at the social cost of redundant fixed 
investments in setting up additional firms (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). In the standard 
model, a tradeoff thus exists between the benefits of competition and the losses from 
additional costs of entry.  
In healthcare, where demand is uncertain and insured consumers tend not to face 
full prices, entry can have additional welfare costs.  These losses come from people 
getting too many or too few services or changes in quality that cannot be observed due to 
asymmetric information (Kenneth Arrow, 1963; Martin Gaynor, 2006; Mark V. Pauly, 
2004).
3  We begin by examining the more standard effect of competition and return to 
moral hazard below. 
   The nature of competition in the input market affects the welfare costs of entry, 
and we explore these effects when input supply is not perfectly elastic. We adopt a simple 
model of monopolistic competition in the input market. We refer to a “wage” for a 
                                                 
3 The combination of these factors can lead to firms competing in a “medical arms race” with excess 
services provided to cover fixed entry costs (Robinson and Luft, 1985).   4
surgeon but note that compensation is more likely set by a bargain in which the hospital 
and surgeon agree to an appropriation of the rents from performing surgery. In the 
monopolistically competitive input market, supply elasticity effectively captures the 
market power held by the surgeon and hospital, respectively.
4 Relying on this framework 
allows us to capture the basic predictions of a Nash bargaining solution while also 
considering the welfare impact of entry in the same model employed by Mankiw and 
Whinston (1986).
  
The first prediction is relatively straightforward. Suppose that surgeons are a 
scarce input, available in imperfectly elastic supply.   Such input scarcity raises the cost 
of entry, thereby reducing the profits of new firms.  The less elastic is labor supply, the 
smaller is the predicted entry associated with opening up markets.
5 
Less straightforward is the situation where inputs vary in quality, and the 
elasticity of input supply differs by quality.  Quality effects are particularly relevant in a 
                                                 
4 The particular nature of the bargain may alter the explicit predictions of the model. However, to the extent 
that the bargaining framework results in each party being paid a reservation wage, the equilibrium 
converges to the monopolistically competitive outcome. For example, Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole (1990) 
show that, under a reasonable set of assumptions, the Nash bargaining solution between upstream and 
downstream firms results in Cournot prices and quantities in the output market (even if the upstream party 
is a monopolist). This situation also resembles our setting in that the mark-up due to market power is 
declining in the number of downstream firms (Patrick Rey and Tirole, 2007).       
 
5 In monopolistic competition, where firms maximize profit subject to demand and input elasticities, the 
condition for the equilibrium number of firms is related to the familiar Lerner equation: 
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faster with entry when inputs are not perfectly supplied.   5
setting such as health care, where the technical skill of labor is important.
6  A firm 
seeking to produce at a given level of quality must hire labor with the requisite skills.  
The cost of achieving a given level of output quality is thus determined by the relative 
scarcity of the inputs required to produce at that level of quality  
A variety of considerations suggest that high-quality surgeons will have less 
elastic labor supply than standard-quality surgeons.  Surgery is a skill that takes time to 
produce; thus, training of high-quality surgeons cannot occur very rapidly.  Further, by 
definition the country as a whole has fewer superstar surgeons than average surgeons.  In 
any given area, the supply of standard-quality surgeons thus will be more elastic than the 
supply of high-quality surgeons.   
The negotiation that determines the allocation of rents between surgeons and 
hospitals depends—on one side—on the relative strength of a hospital’s threat to 
substitute between surgeons at a given level of quality and—on the other—on the 
countervailing threat of a surgeon transferring volume to a different hospital. In this way, 
changes in the number of hospitals on equilibrium quantities and wage offers will 
differentially impact high-quality and standard-quality surgeons.
 7 
To see this more precisely, consider the equilibrium quality and quantity choices 
made by hospitals when entry is prohibited.  If hospitals act as oligopsonists in the input 
market, they will demand standard-quality (i.e., “acceptable”) surgeons more than high-
quality surgeons.  The reason is that the supply of high-quality surgeons is less elastic, 
                                                 
6 For example, the average mortality rate for the worst-performing 20 percent of bypass surgeons in our 
sample in 1994-1995 was 2.5 times that of the top 20 percent. 
7 John Sutton (1991) argues that firms can make investments that limit the degree of subsequent entry.  His 
theory of endogenous sunk costs focuses primarily on investments, such as those in R&D or brands, that 
are difficult for new entrants to replicate.  To the extent that our model hinges on firms capturing a scarce 
input (i.e., high-quality labor) as a limiting factor in subsequent entry, it can be seen as an application of 
Sutton’s model.  Specifically, one may consider the recruitment of high-quality labor to be akin to R&D 
aimed at improving the quality of a firm’s product.   6
causing hospital profits to dissipate more rapidly by employing them.  In the limit with 
only one high-quality surgeon, that surgeon would earn all of the rents associated with his 
or her superior quality. 
The entry of new firms reduces the ability of any one firm to influence the input 
market by withholding capacity, as each firm accounts for a smaller share of total output. 
In short, entry moves the market from its equilibrium oligopsony quantity to a larger 
near-competitive quantity.  This increase in quantity will be larger in markets that are 
further from the competitive equilibrium under restricted entry – that is, markets where 
labor supply is less elastic.  To the extent that high-quality surgeons supply labor less 
elastically than standard-quality surgeons, we would thus expect to see a differentially 
larger increase in the use of high-quality surgeons under free entry. 
 
II. EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA  
A. CABG Surgery 
  CABG surgery was developed in the late 1960s and entered mainstream use in the 
United States during the 1970s.  The procedure involves surgically isolating a section of 
vein (from the leg) or artery (from the chest) and grafting it to create a bypass of 
blockage in the coronary artery.  In a traditional CABG, the patient is placed on a heart-
lung bypass machine, which performs the functions of the heart during the grafting 
process.  Following the procedure, the patient remains in the hospital for several days to 
allow caregivers to monitor the recovery process. 
  The use of CABG grew substantially during the technology’s first three decades.  
Among the United States population age 50 or greater, the number of CABG procedures   7
grew from a nationwide total of 15,000 in 1971 to a peak of 552,000 in 1997 before 
falling to 424,000 by 2003 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2006).  This decline in 
CABG has been attributed to increased competition from less-invasive treatments, such 
as percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) (David M. Cutler and Robert 
S. Huckman, 2003). PTCA is a less intensive way of fixing coronary occlusions, but 
failure during the procedure can require emergency CABG surgery. As a result, many 
states, including Pennsylvania, require the presence of CABG back-up for the 
performance of PTCA.
8 Because PTCA is less intensive but still well reimbursed, its use 
spread over the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus some of the hospitals in our sample may 
have entered the CABG market with the primary aim of providing CABG itself while 
others may have done so with the primary aim of developing a strong PTCA program. 
We exploit this difference in entry motives as a robustness check later in our analysis.  
  CABG is an expensive procedure to provide, and the fixed costs of setting up a 
CABG facility are significant.  Huckman (2006) finds the average fixed cost to establish 
a CABG program in New York State to be $14 million. Further, Jamie Robinson et al. 
(2001) present reported setup costs of $13.4 and $12 million for two programs entering 
the Pennsylvania market in 2000.  To put such an investment in perspective, we note that 
the average net income between 1996 and 2005 for hospitals entering the CABG market 
in Pennsylvania was $3.5 million.
9 In addition, the ongoing costs of a CABG program are 
significant, as hospitals offering the procedure typically employ a staff of nurses, 
perfusionists, and other technicians dedicated to cardiac surgery. 
                                                 
8 In certain “low-risk” cases, PTCA may be conducted at a Pennsylvania hospital without CABG back-up. 
Nevertheless, the majority of PTCA cases occurring during our sample period would have required the 
presence of CABG at the hospital. 
9 Authors calculation using data from the Medicare Cost Reports 1996-2005.   8
  Despite its high cost, CABG is very profitable for hospitals.  Roughly half of 
CABG patients are covered by Medicare, which pays relatively generously.  Most of the 
remainder is privately insured.  Further, a large number of people have coronary artery 
disease, so resources rarely sit idle.  It is generally believed that, along with orthopedics 
and oncology, cardiac care accounts for the bulk of many hospitals’ profit.  Thus, the 
impact of CON regulation on CABG surgery has important implications for overall 
hospital profitability. 
 
B. The Hospital-Surgeon Relationship 
  Our model assumes that firms choose the quality of the employees they hire.  
With few exceptions, however, hospitals tend not to employ surgeons.  Rather, they 
provide them with surgical privileges and access to facilities, such as operating rooms. 
Still a hospital may provide a surgeon with various non-pecuniary benefits that may 
influence the degree to which the surgeon performs procedures at that facility.  For 
example, one way for a hospital to lure a physician is through preferred scheduling: the 
physician might be promised his or her choice of operating rooms and a dedicated time to 
use the room.  The quantity and composition of the surgeon’s clinical support staff, such 
as nurses and anesthesiologists, represents another means by which hospitals may attract 
surgeons.  In addition, there may be intangible benefits such as preferred access to 
parking, office space, and administrative support.  Effectively, the hospital and physician 
enter an at-least-implicit contract that specifies how the joint benefits of surgery are to be 
split, without any direct money changing hands between the two parties. As such, we 
think of this relationship as akin to employment, even without a direct monetary   9
transaction. In this case, the “wage” paid by the hospital is reflected in the value of the 
various benefits conveyed to the surgeon. 
 
C. CABG and CON Regulation in Pennsylvania  
  With encouragement from the federal government, individual states instituted 
CON regulations for hospitals during the 1970s.  These regulations required state 
approval before hospitals could invest in costly technologies, such as cardiac surgery.  
CON was instituted as a reaction to concerns that competition between hospitals would 
lead to a “medical arms race” (James Robinson and Harold Luft, 1985) characterized by 
excessive service provision and increased cost.  During the 1980s, a push toward 
deregulation reduced federal funding for CON programs, and states responded by 
dismantling or scaling back these regulations.  On December 18, 1996, Pennsylvania 
repealed its CON law, effectively allowing free entry into a broad range of hospital 
services, including cardiac surgery. 
  At the time Pennsylvania repealed its CON law, 43 hospitals were licensed to 
provide CABG surgery in the state.  This figure represented 16 percent of all acute-care 
hospitals in the state and 33 percent of all acute-care hospitals with 200 or more beds—
the threshold hospital size that is often assumed necessary to support a bypass program.  
Following the repeal of CON, entry into CABG was swift, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Four programs entered in each of the years 1997 and 1998, and there were 23 total 
entrants by 2003.  In 2000, post-CON entrants accounted for 10 percent of 
Pennsylvania’s total CABG volume.  This figure grew to 20 percent by 2003.  All   10
together, there was a 46 percent net increase in the number of CABG programs in the 
state between 1996 and 2003.
10   
To determine how much of the above growth was due to the repeal of CON, 
Figure 2 presents the total number of CABG programs in Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey for the period from 1995 to 2003.  Because New York and New Jersey 
maintained CON regulation throughout the study period, we use them as controls for the 
rate of growth in new CABG programs that would have occurred between 1995 and 2003 
under regulated entry.  Based on these controls, the repeal of CON led to the entry of 
between 10 and 16 of the 23 new CABG programs in Pennsylvania.
11 
  A majority of hospitals that entered the CABG market after the repeal of CON 
were in the suburbs of major cities.  Figure 3 plots incumbent and entrant programs on a 
map of Pennsylvania.  Thirteen of the 23 entrants were in the suburbs of either 
Philadelphia or Pittsburgh.  The remaining new programs were distributed throughout the 
state but tended to be located in medium-sized cities where an incumbent program had a 
virtual monopoly on CABG surgery prior to the repeal of CON.  For example, both 
Johnstown and Altoona had one incumbent program each before 1996, and each faced 
one entrant following CON repeal.  The Wilkes-Barre and Scranton area moved from two 
incumbent programs—one in each town—to a total of five programs.  Some areas of the 
state, particularly the less-densely-populated northern interior, had few or no new 
programs.     
                                                 
10 Between 1996 and 2003, three existing CABG programs exited the Pennsylvania market. 
11 We return to this estimate later when computing the welfare impact of the repeal of CON in 
Pennsylvania. We bound the cost in the welfare calculations between the fixed cost associated with the 20  
new entrants (without controlling for New Jersey and New York) and the lower bound of 10 new entrants 
attributable to the policy change including controls from nearby states.   11
Table 1 presents information on the size of new programs.  On average, entrant 
programs are smaller than incumbents in terms of both total procedures and procedures 
per surgeon (160 procedures per year over the 2000-2003 period compared to 349 for 
incumbent programs).  The relatively low volumes at entrant programs are not surprising 
given the time required for a new program to reach an “equilibrium” level of volume. For 
example, the three hospitals that entered the market in 1997 averaged 174 total surgeries 
in their first year of operation. By 2003, however, those same programs performed an 
average of 305 surgeries (relative to the 2003 average of 296 procedures per incumbent 
program) despite a decline in the statewide CABG volume between 1997 and 2003. 
Many new programs aimed to establish themselves by contracting with surgeons 
who were already licensed in Pennsylvania and practicing at incumbent hospitals.  Of the 
225 surgeons performing at least one CABG procedure in Pennsylvania in the years 2000 
through 2003,
12 122 split their time across hospitals.  Over half of the surgeons 
performing CABG surgery at entrant hospitals during the 2000-2003 period worked at a 
different institution under CON; the remainder were new to the market.    
Despite the entry of new surgeons, the net supply of surgeons did not change 
much during the study period. Between 1994 and 2004, there was a net increase of only 
10 physicians, or 5 percent,
13 despite the addition of many new programs. 
 
D. Data 
                                                 
12 This figure excludes surgeons who performed surgeries only in 2001, as Pennsylvania did not make data 
on CABG procedures available for that year. 
13 Entry and exit are defined by the year of licensure in the state of Pennsylvania. Exit year is determined 
by the last available year that a surgeon was licensed to practice if a license was not renewed. Entry is the 
first year a surgeon was licensed to practice in the state.   12
  The primary source of data for our analysis is the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council (PHC4), which has collected patient-level records for every 
individual receiving CABG at a hospital in Pennsylvania in 1994, 1995, 2000, 2002, and 
2003.
14  These data cover 89,406 procedures performed by 303 physicians at 67 hospitals.  
The PHC4 data identifies both the surgeon and hospital associated with each procedure.  
In addition, it provides a wide range of patient-level covariates such as age, gender, and 
several clinical measures of illness severity. 
  For some descriptive analyses, we use another PHC4 database that reports the 
total number of CABG patients over the entire period from 1993 to 2003.  These data, 
however, are from standard discharge abstracts and, as such, do not include the same 
patient-level clinical information that is found in the first database described above.  In 
addition, these latter data do not have the validated surgeon identifiers that are present in 
the former dataset. Finally, we use data from the Medicare Cost Reports for the period 
from 1993 to 2003 to examine the profitability of various categories of Pennsylvania 
hospitals around the repeal of CON.  
  
E. Measuring Provider Quality 
  We distinguish high-quality from standard-quality surgeons using data on the 
risk-adjusted, in-hospital mortality of their CABG patients.  To adjust binary mortality 
outcomes for patient severity, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
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14 These data are not available for the years 1996-1999 and 2001.   13
where i indexes patients, s surgeons, and h hospitals.  The indicator morti,s,h, equals one if 
patient i died in the hospital and zero otherwise.  Xi is a matrix of covariates that includes 
controls for several patient characteristics and existing clinical conditions that could 
affect a patient’s underlying probability of dying in the hospital.
15  We calculate the risk-
adjusted mortality rate (RAMRs,h) for each surgeon-hospital pair as:  
RAMRs,h=(OMRs,h/EMRs,h)*OMRPA      (2) 
where OMRs,h is the observed mortality rate for surgeon s at hospital h, and EMRs,h is the 
expected mortality rate – the average predicted probability of mortality from (1)—for the 
same surgeon-hospital pair.  The final term, OMRPA is the average observed mortality rate 
for the entire state over the sample period; this multiplication normalizes risk-adjusted 
mortality to the statewide average. 
 
III. RESULTS  
  We report our results in four parts.  First, we look at the impact of entry on the 
volume of cases and profit for entrant and incumbent hospitals.  Second, we consider how 
market share shifts among surgeons of different quality levels following entry.  Third, we 
examine whether these changes in volume have spillover effects – positive or negative – 
due to scale effects at the level of the hospital or surgeon. Finally, we look at the impact 
of entry on the distances patients travel for care. 
  
A. Changes in Quantity and Profit 
                                                 
15 Examples of the variables included in Xi are patient age, gender, complicated hypertension, heart failure, heart 
attack, kidney failure, and cardiogenic shock.  A full list of the covariates included in this regression, as well as 
the resulting coefficient estimates, can be found in various PHC4 publications.  For instance, the covariates and 
results for the 1994 and 1995 data can be found in Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (1998).   14
Standard models predict that free entry will lower prices and raise volume, 
thereby increasing consumer surplus.  In health care, however, the situation is somewhat 
more complex.  Because consumers often are not well informed about their needs for 
particular services and are insured for much of the cost, it is not obvious that increased 
quantities of care are welfare enhancing.  Indeed, many models of health care predict 
overconsumption in equilibrium (Arrow, 1963; Joseph P. Newhouse, 1970; Richard 
Zeckhauser, 1970), with greater service provision potentially reducing welfare.
16 
Determining the welfare impact of entry-related changes in volume thus requires 
empirical analysis. 
Figure 4 shows per capita CABG volume in Pennsylvania between 1990 and 
2003, as well as similar figures for New York and New Jersey—nearby states where 
CON regulation remained in place throughout the sample period. Though Pennsylvania 
provides significantly more CABG procedures per capita than either of the two control 
states, this relative difference does not change following the repeal of CON.  In all three 
states, volume per capita increases in the early to mid-1990s and then declines, consistent 
with the national trend.  Regression analysis confirms the impression from the figure.  
Relating CABG volume to a post-1996 indicator, state indicator variables, and a post-
1996 Pennsylvania-specific indicator yields a coefficient on the differential impact in 
Pennsylvania after 1996 of -417 (standard error=2,234).
17  In addition to being 
statistically insignificant, the estimated value of this coefficient is actually negative 
suggesting, if anything, a slightly greater decline in total CABG volume following the 
repeal of CON.  
                                                 
16 In fact, this argument is commonly offered as a reason for the institution of CON regulation. 
17 Our results are similar when the denominator of the CABG rate is limited to population age 45 and older. 
   15
In addition to analyzing the effect of entry across states, we use variation in the 
timing and extent of entry across markets within Pennsylvania to estimate the effect of 
entry on the volume of CABG procedures at incumbent hospitals. We define markets 
using the hospital referral regions (HRRs) developed by John Wennberg et al. (1999) – 
groups of zip codes in which residents travel to roughly the same hospitals for acute 
care.
18  Wennberg et al. (1999) group Pennsylvania into 15 HRRs.  We form semi-annual 
CABG volumes for incumbent and entrant hospitals and estimate longitudinal models for 
incumbent volume as a function of market fixed effects, year fixed effects, and entrant 
volume in the preceding six months.  The results suggest that each additional surgery at 
an entrant program is associated with a reduction of 1.72 (standard error=0.14) surgeries 
at incumbent hospitals in the same HRR.  This coefficient is significantly different not 
only from zero but also from one, suggesting that incumbent hospitals may substitute 
angioplasty for CABG in markets where entry is more prevalent.  Taken together, the 
evidence both across states and within Pennsylvania suggests no increase in overall 
CABG utilization in conjunction with free entry.
19  
The complement to volume is price. Our data do not include information on prices 
paid to hospitals, as negotiated rates are proprietary.  Nevertheless, some things are 
known.  Fifty-four percent of the procedures in our data are performed on patients 
covered by Medicare.  As a result of Medicare’s administered pricing system—with 
reimbursement depending on the diagnosis of the patient, the teaching status of the 
hospital, local wage rates, and the level of low-income patients the hospital serves—
                                                 
18 Specifically, the areas are defined by the hospitals visited for cardiac care by 80 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries in that zip code (Wennberg et al.1999).   
19 These results are consistent with Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel’s (1999) study of free entry in radio 
broadcasting in which roughly eighty percent of new entry leads to the transfer of customers between firms 
without expanding demand.   16
Medicare prices are not a direct choice variable for a hospital.  Further, prices for patients 
with private insurance tend to vary with Medicare rates, making most hospitals price-
takers, at least in the short term.
20 
With no change in overall quantity but a shift of volume to new entrants, the 
short-run allocation of profits thus moves away from incumbent hospitals and toward 
entrants.  Ordinarily, shifting profits is not a policy concern, as all profits count equally in 
social welfare calculations.  This assumption may not be true in health care, however, 
where private firms provide varying levels of public goods.  Most hospitals—at least not-
for-profit hospitals—have an explicit goal of subsidizing less-profitable care with the 
returns from treating more-profitable patients.  If incumbent CABG providers accounted 
for a disproportionately large share of the provision of public goods, free entry could thus 
result in welfare losses from the redistribution of rents. 
A common measure of less-remunerative care is the share of uninsured people 
seen at a given hospital.  Unfortunately, we are not able to obtain this information for the 
institutions in our sample.  Nevertheless, the level of Medicaid patients at a hospital is 
likely to be correlated with its level of uninsured patients.  Thus, we examine how 
incumbent and entrant hospitals compare in terms of Medicaid admissions.  We find that 
incumbent CABG hospitals have a larger proportion of Medicaid patients (across all 
diagnoses) than eventual CABG entrants.  In 1994-1995, 15 percent of admissions at 
incumbent hospitals were insured by Medicaid, compared to 10 percent at eventual 
                                                 
20 Chernew et al. (2002) find evidence of variation in the profitability of CABG surgery across payer types. 
They also find that competition reduces the profitability of CABG performed on managed care patients. We 
cannot investigate these effects directly without price data. We note, however, that our hospital-level profit 
analysis (below) addresses the welfare impact of changes in prices and payer mix to the extent they affect 
overall hospital profit.   17
CABG entrants (p-value for difference<0.01) and 16 percent for those hospitals that 
never introduced CABG (p-value for difference=0.54). 
Of course, hospital operations are not static, and these firms can react to a loss of 
profitable volume in many ways.  For example, salaries might be lowered or services cut.  
To examine the impact of CON repeal on overall profitability, we consider the long-run 
impact of entry on profits.  Hospitals are required to file cost reports with Medicare that 
list net patient revenues and operating expenses, from which we derive operating margins 
(i.e., operating income divided by net patient revenues).   
We present data on trends in hospital profits, but note an obvious caveat:  CABG 
is but one service offered by these hospitals, and overall profitability depends on the total 
portfolio of services provided by an institution.  Still, two features argue for the relevance 
of this analysis.  First, cardiac care is a large part of hospital profits, as noted earlier.  
Second, with the lessons learned from studying CABG may inform a hospital’s 
understanding of markets for similarly intensive services.   
  Figure 5 presents the time series of operating margins for incumbent and entrant 
hospitals, as well as other Pennsylvania hospitals that never entered the CABG market.  
All hospitals that eventually developed a cardiac program, either incumbents or entrants, 
are more profitable than those that never entered the market.  Margins for incumbent 
hospitals were negative in much of the late 1990s—the period immediately following 
CON repeal.  However, these institutions regained profitability by 2002 and were, in fact, 
the most profitable hospitals by the end of the observation period.
21  The specific steps 
                                                 
21 To examine the significance of these changes, we ran a regression of operating margin for incumbent 
hospitals against the share of new entrants in the incumbent’s hospitals HRR, a time trend, and hospital 
fixed effects.  We found no significant effect of entry; the coefficient on entry share is negative but 
insignificant.  The same was true for the profitability of entrants.     18
incumbent hospitals took to regain profitability cannot be observed in our data, but the 
results suggest that, overall, these hospitals were not put in a precarious position by the 
elimination of CON.   
 
B. Changes in Quality from Redistribution of Inputs 
Our earlier theoretical discussion posits that free entry may increase the demand 
for relatively inelastic factors – in this case, high-quality surgeons.  To evaluate the direct 
effect of entry on the input decisions of firms, we rely on variation in the level of entry 
across markets (i.e. HRRs) in Pennsylvania following the repeal of CON.  We estimate 
the following specification: 
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We define surgshares,j,t as the share held by surgeon s in market j in quarter t.   We relate 
this variable to entrantshare_groupj,t, a vector of indicators for whether the share of 
CABG procedures in market j occurring at entrant hospitals is in the following 
categories: 1-10%, 11-20%, or above 20%; highquals, an indicator for whether surgeon s 
is a high-quality surgeon;
22 and newdocs, an indicator for surgeons who entered the 
Pennsylvania market after CON repeal and, as a result, could not be distinguished by 
hospitals as being either standard- or high-quality in the period before CON repeal. We 
also interact  entrantshare_groupj,t with both highqual and newdocs. The coefficients on 
these interactions capture the differential share changes following entry for high-quality 
and new surgeons, respectively, compared to standard-quality surgeons.   
                                                 
22 We discuss our definitions of high- and standard-quality surgeons later in the manuscript.   19
  We note that our specification of the entrant share variable enables us to capture a 
potential non-linear relationship between entry and the demand for particular categories 
of surgeons. Our theory suggests such non-linearity may exist, as the marginal effect of 
entry on oligopsony power in the market is declining in the number of firms.
23 
We define highquals in four ways.  Our base estimates define highquals as the top 
10 percent of surgeons with at least 50 operations in the CON period (1994-95).  All 
other surgeons who performed at least one procedure in Pennsylvania in 1994-95 are 
considered standard-quality surgeons and represent the excluded category in our analysis. 
In subsequent estimates, we define highquals as the top 20, 30, and 40 percent of 
surgeons, respectively, using a similar methodology.  As noted above, surgeons entering 
the Pennsylvania market after CON repeal are not eligible for the highquals category and 
instead are included in the newdocs category. 
Control variables in (3) include fixed effects for quarter ( t α ) and surgeon-market 
pairs ( j s I , ).  Our model predicts 0 2 > β : when more firms enter a market, the share of 
surgeries performed by high-quality surgeons should rise relative to the share held by 
standard-quality surgeons.   
Estimates of 1 β  are negative and precisely estimated over all ranges of entrant 
share in Column 1 of Table 2.  The sign of these coefficients suggests that gains in share 
by entrant hospitals are associated with reductions in share for standard-quality surgeons.  
                                                 
23 General models of entry with imperfect competition also predict a non-linear relationship between entry 
and competition. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss (1991) study entry empirically and find most of 
the competitive effect comes from the second and third entrants, with diminishing impact on market 
conduct beyond that level. Jean M. Abraham et al. (forthcoming) also find a non-linear effect of entry on 
competition in hospital markets.   20
As we relax the definition of a high-quality surgeon in Columns 2 and 3, this relationship 
remains negative and significant for entrant shares between one and 10 percent.   
Consistent with our predictions, the estimates of the 2 β  coefficients are positive 
and significant in Column 1 for markets with up to 20 percent share held by entrant 
hospitals.  The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that increasing entrant share 
beyond zero and up to 10 percent is associated with an increase of 2.6 percentage points 
for the average high-quality surgeon relative to the impact for the average standard-
quality surgeon.  For entrants holding between 10 and 20 percent share, this increase is 
2.1 percentage points greater than the 1.2 percentage point decline for standard-quality 
surgeons.  The magnitude of these effects is economically significant.  The average high-
quality surgeon (based on the top 10 percent definition) had an average market share of 
4.9 percent between 2000 and 2003.  The reallocation associated with entry is thus 
equivalent to a 53 percent increase (relative to the mean) in share for high-quality 
surgeons in markets with positive entrant share less than 10 percent and a 44 percent 
increase for the same surgeons in markets with entrant share between 10 and 20 percent.  
In Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient estimates for 2 β are positive for entrant shares 
between one and 10 percent, though the point estimates are smaller and significant at 
only the 10% level.   
The effect of new entry on reallocation to high-quality surgeons falls off in all 
specifications as entrant market share grows beyond either 10 or 20 percent.  This 
tapering suggests entry up to that point may be sufficient to push demand for high-quality 
surgeons from its regulated level to the competitive equilibrium.  Indeed, above these 
threshold entrant shares, additional share seems to go to surgeons who are new to the   21
Pennsylvania market, as shown by the positive and relatively large (though statistically 
insignificant)  3 β coefficients for entrant shares above 10 percent.  Finally, we note that 
both the magnitude and significance of the relative share increase for high-quality 
surgeons declines as we move from the most-restrictive definition of a high-quality 
surgeon (i.e., top 10 percent in Column 1) to the least restrictive (i.e., top 40 percent in 
Column 4).  This tapering supports our contention that the top surgeons are in relatively 
high demand following entry.   
Our analysis to this point has treated all entrants as similar.  As noted earlier, 
however, this assumption may not be appropriate, as some hospitals may enter the CABG 
market because they want to do a significant number of CABG surgeries while others 
may enter primarily as backup for angioplasty (i.e., PTCA) services.  Hospitals entering 
the CABG market primarily as backup for PTCA may place less of a premium on a high-
quality CABG surgeon and, in turn, may be more likely to contract with standard-quality 
surgeons. 
As a robustness check, we test for this distinction by measuring the degree to 
which each entrant hospital is “focused” on either CABG or PTCA. Our measure of focus 
is CABG’s share of all revascularization procedures (i.e., CABG plus PTCA) at a 
hospital after it enters the CABG market.  For each entrant, we compare the actual value 
of this CABG share measure to its predicted value based on a regression for all entrants, 
controlling for calendar time and years since entry. Hospitals with higher-than-predicted   22
CABG shares are classified as CABG focused while those with lower-than-predicted 
shares are classified as PTCA focused.
24  
There are two potential concerns with this measure. First, ex post CABG volume 
may be affected by quality after entry. Second, entering hospitals may not reach their 
“equilibrium” focus immediately. We attempt to minimize both concerns by computing a 
hospital’s CABG share during its second year in the CABG market. This timing is long 
enough to reduce the noise in CABG share due the initial ramp up of new programs but 
short enough to minimize a program’s ability to adjust volume endogenously. Further, 
even a noisy approximation of CABG focus provides a useful measure to test the 
robustness of our estimates for the overall effects of entry from equation (3). Using this 
methodology, 13 of the 23 entrants were CABG focused.  
After determining each entrant’s focus, we estimate the following model: 
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where CABGentrantshare_groupj,t and PTCAentrantshare_groupj,t are separate vectors of 
entrant share indicators—analogous to entrantshare_groupj,t in (1)—for CABG-focused 
and PTCA-focused entrants, respectively. Our theory suggests that CABG-focused 
entrants should be more likely than PTCA-focused entrants to view CABG surgeons as 
differentiated inputs. As such, our base results should be strongest among CABG-focused 
entrants, suggesting that we should expect β2 > 0 and β2 > β5. 
                                                 
24 Formally, we regress the share of cardiac procedures (i.e., CABG plus PTCA) that were CABGs at 
hospital h in quarter t on the number of years since hospital h entered the CABG market and indicators for 
calendar quarter.   23
Table 3 illustrates that the effect of entry by PTCA-focused hospitals has no 
differential effect on the shares of surgeries held by high-quality or new surgeons ( 5 β and 
6 β , like 4 β , are small and statistically insignificant). This is true over the full range of 
definitions for high-quality surgeons. In contrast, entry by CABG-focused hospitals leads 
to a statistically significant reallocation of surgeries toward top surgeons. Initial entry 
(i.e., up to 10 percent of the market held by CABG-focused entrants) leads to an average 
increase of 2.7 percentage points in market share for high quality surgeons relative to the 
average effect for standard quality surgeons. These effects continue to be positive and 
significant with subsequent entry. Entry resulting in 10 to 20 percent market share for 
CABG-focused entrants results in a 2.0 percentage point increase in share for high-
quality relative to standard-quality surgeons; entrant share in excess of 20 percent leads 
to a relative increase of 3.1 percentage points for high-quality surgeons.
25  
 
C. Changes in Quality from Volume-Outcome Effects 
The redistribution of cases from standard- to high-quality surgeons may have a 
secondary effect on quality due to within-surgeon changes in volume that could 
themselves induce changes in quality.  This effect, commonly referred to as the volume-
outcome relationship, is based on the premise that higher volume is associated with better 
surgical outcomes (Luft et al., 1979).
26  Edward L. Hannan et al. (2003) estimate that in-
hospital mortality rates were significantly lower for hospitals with between 200 and 800 
                                                 
25 We note, however, that we cannot reject the joint test for all entrant share groups that  5 2 β β =  (p-value 
of .22). Despite this, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients for CABG- and PTCA-focused programs 
are consistent with our general model and suggest that entry by CABG-focused firms is more likely to lead 
to increased demand for high-quality inputs than is entry by PTCA-focused firms. 
26 See David M. Shahian and Sharon-Lise T. Normand (2003) and Gaynor et al. (2005) for discussions of 
the literature on the volume-outcome relationship.   24
surgeries annually and for surgeons performing more than 125 surgeries annually (see 
Shahian and Normand (2003), Eric D. Peterson et al. (2004) and Ethan A. Halm et al. 
(2002) for additional discussion of appropriate volume thresholds).  In this section, we 
use these cutoffs to distinguish high- and low-volume providers.  Table 4 shows the share 
of hospitals and surgeons in our sample below recommended volume levels in different 
years.  In 1994, 23 percent of hospitals and 65 percent of surgeons failed to meet these 
levels.  In 2000, a year with approximately the same total CABG volume as 1994, these 
shares were higher for hospitals (27 percent) and lower for surgeons (60 percent).  By 
2003, the share of patients seen by below-threshold providers increased with respect to 
both hospitals and surgeons. 
We are interested not simply in the share of hospitals and surgeons working at an 
efficient scale but also in the likelihood that a patient actually receives CABG from such 
a provider (i.e., one with annual volume above the threshold level).  To address this issue 
we estimate a model of the following form:  
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In (5), highvoli,s,h,t is an indicator equal to one if patient i received CABG from a high-
volume surgeon, at a high-volume hospital, or from a high-volume surgeon-hospital pair 
(depending on the specification).  Entrantsharej,t is the share of volume in market j in 
quarter t going to hospitals that entered the market following the repeal of CON.  Zi is a 
matrix of clinical and demographic characteristics for patient i similar to that included in 
(1).  In addition, we include quarter and market fixed effects and cluster standard errors at   25
the market level.  Given the binary dependent variable, we estimate (5) as a conditional 
logit model. 
  Column 1 of Table 5 presents estimates of the likelihood that a patient sees a 
high-volume surgeon.  We define a high-volume surgeon according to several different 
thresholds for annual volume, ranging from 200 down to 75 cases per year.  Column 2 
repeats this analysis with respect to high-volume hospitals, again using multiple volume 
thresholds.  Finally, Column 3 presents results based on threshold volumes for surgeon-
hospital pairings (i.e., the number of surgeries performed by a given surgeon at a specific 
hospital).  This last specification is motivated by the potential for firm-specific volume-
outcome effects in cardiac surgery (Huckman and Gary P. Pisano, 2006).  For each 
volume threshold, we present the coefficient estimate for 1 β  in (5) as well as the marginal 
effect estimated at the patient-weighted-mean value of entrant share (19 percent). 
The only statistically significant effects are found with respect to the likelihood 
that a patient is seen at a hospital performing in excess of 150 or 200 surgeries annually 
or that a patient is seen by a surgeon performing in excess of 100 surgeries annually.  The 
hospital-level results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in entrant share is 
associated with roughly a five percentage point reduction in the probability of CABG 
occurring at a hospital performing more than 200 CABGs in that year and a one 
percentage point reduction in the probability of CABG occurring at a hospital performing 
more than 150 procedures.  These results, however, may reflect the fact that entrant 
hospitals are not operating at their equilibrium volumes shortly after entry.  We also note 
that the same 10 percentage point increase in entrant share is associated with an 11 
percentage point increase in the probability that CABG is provided by a surgeon   26
performing at least 100 surgeries in that year. The estimates in Table 4 are sensitive to the 
choice of volume threshold. Given that fact, and the offsetting effects on physician and 
hospital volume, these results do not suggest a strong volume-related effect of entry on 
surgical quality. 
 
D. Changes in Travel Distance 
  A final potential benefit of entry is reduced travel time for patients. Studies of 
consumer choice in health care consistently find that distance or travel time are important 
determinants of provider choice (Luft et al., 1990; Lawton R. Burns and Douglas R. 
Wholey, 1992; Mark McClellan et al., 1994; Michael E. Chernew et al., 1998). Travel 
time in medical care is particularly important in emergency settings, as longer travel can 
increase the probability of mortality. A large portion of CABGs, however, are elective.  
In the aftermath of a heart attack, a patient will be stabilized, and medications or PTCA 
will be used to open the blocked artery. CABG might be performed later – either during 
the initial admission or a subsequent one. For CABG, the issue of travel time is thus less 
one of survival than of convenience.   
We address the impact of entry on travel distance by estimating the following 
equation: 
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Disti,s,h,t is the distance (in miles) from the center of the patient’s zip code to the center of 
the hospital’s zip code.
27 The estimate of  1 β is -0.12 (standard error=.02), which suggests 
that, at the mean entrant share, the average CABG recipient traveled 2.3 fewer miles 
following entry. This represents a nine percent reduction in travel distance relative to the 
patient-weighted average travel distance prior to entry of 27 miles. Nevertheless, for a 
one-time intervention lasting only a few days, such as CABG, this decrease may not have 
a large effect on consumer welfare. We return to this issue in the next section.  
 
IV.   THE WELFARE IMPACT OF FREE ENTRY 
Our results allow for a rough calculation of the gains and losses from free entry 
associated with the repeal of Pennsylvania’s CON law.  The cost of free entry is the fixed 
cost of the new programs.  Estimates of the average fixed cost per new program vary 
between $12 and $14 million (Robinson et al., 2004; Huckman, 2006), yielding a total 
social cost of between $120 million and $280 million for the 10-to-20 new CABG 
programs we attribute to CON repeal.
28 
As noted above, a key benefit of entry is the improvement in quality as surgeries 
are transferred from standard- to high-quality surgeons.  To estimate the number of 
deaths averted, we rely on coefficient estimates reported in Table 2.  The average entrant 
share was 13 percent in 2000 and 19 percent in 2003. We apply these entry shares to the 
coefficients in Table 2 to compute the additional share of surgeries done by high-quality 
                                                 
27 Perhaps the best measure of distance is how far relatives and caregivers have to travel.  Unfortunately, 
this information is not available. 
28 The lower bound is computed by comparing the number of new programs that entered in Pennsylvania in 
the five years between the repeal of CON and 2000 to the entry rate in New York and New Jersey (states 
that maintained CON) over the same period. During that period, an additional 12 programs entered in 
Pennsylvania compared to 3 in New York and 2 in New Jersey. We use the larger difference (10 programs) 
to ensure that our estimates are conservative. The upper bound assumes that all entry over our entire 
sample period (20 programs from 1995 to 2003) was due to the repeal of CON.    28
surgeons following entry. Specifically, we compute the difference in average RAMR 
between the surgeons whose market share was increased (the top 10 percent), those who 
saw no change in volume (those in the 10
th-to-30
th percentiles), and those who would 
have otherwise performed the surgery (the bottom 70 percent of surgeons). Taking this 
change and scaling it by the average number of surgeries in Pennsylvania suggests that 
about 11 additional patients per year survived CABG because of the share redistribution 
following CON repeal. 
The average Medicare beneficiary who survives bypass surgery lives another 
eight years.  Assuming this applies to all CABG patients (54 percent are Medicare 
beneficiaries), the redistribution of volume across surgeons is associated with an increase 
of 88 life years for each calendar year. Quality of life during those years, however, is not 
perfect; Tammy O. Tengs and Amy Wallace (2000) estimate that patients receiving 
CABG who are still alive 10 years later have a quality of life of 0.9 on a scale of death 
(0) to perfect health (1).  Thus, the above figure translates into 79 additional quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs).
29  The cost per QALY is therefore between $101,000 and 
$236,000.
30 Typical estimates of the value of a year of life in good health are between 
$100,000 and $250,000 (Cutler, 2004; Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, 2006), a 
figure that is roughly equal to our estimate of the cost per QALY.
31 Thus, our estimates 
                                                 
29 A quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is a year of life in perfect health. We use the available QALY 
weight of 0.9 (Tengs and Wallace, 2000) for the patient population that most closely resembles that of 
interest in our study—patients receiving CABG who are alive 10 years after surgery.  
30 The fixed costs of entry are amortized over the lifespan of a new CABG operating room. Discussions 
with hospital executives suggest 15 years is an appropriate length of time. 
31 The reduction in travel time also improves welfare but only by a small amount. Scaling the average 
reduction in travel distance (2.3 miles) by an estimate for the number of visitors and the median wage in 
Pennsylvania suggests a value of roughly $7.50 per patient. 
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suggest that gains from mortality reductions due to the redistribution of cases from 
standard- to high-quality surgeons approximately offset the fixed cost of free entry.  
Our calculations involve several uncertainties.  In addition to the issues noted 
above, we only account for quality improvements associated with in-hospital mortality.  
Entry and redistribution of volume may yield gains in patient outcomes other than 
mortality (e.g., reduced morbidity). Our calculations also do not account for the reduced 
cost associated with eliminating the administrative infrastructure required to operate 
Pennsylvania’s CON program. Finally, our estimates are based on attributing all of the 
fixed costs associated with a new CABG program to CABG alone when, in all likelihood, 
some portion of these costs should be attributed to a hospital’s PTCA program (for which 
CABG represents a necessary backup).
32 Given that all of these qualifications either 
lower the fixed costs attributable to CABG or increase the benefits of CABG entry, our 
cost-per-QALY estimates likely overestimate the true cost of CON repeal. With these 
caveats and given the range of welfare estimates, our results suggest on net that the repeal 
of CON was roughly welfare neutral. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  The well-known potential for free entry to be inefficient is realized when firms 
make entry decisions without internalizing the costs associated with the business they 
“steal” from incumbent firms.  We show that input scarcity materially affects this 
conclusion.  Theoretically, adding firms to a market with input scarcity is less likely to 
lead to excessive entry because entry is both inherently limited by factor supply and 
likely to increase demand differentially for high-quality factors of production. 
                                                 
   30
In the setting we consider – the entry of CABG programs in Pennsylvania – this quality 
effect is apparent.  Market share is distributed to higher-quality surgeons following entry, 
thereby improving the overall quality of surgical outcomes.  The resulting welfare gains 
from entry are about equal to the losses from increased fixed costs, making free entry 
approximately welfare neutral. 
Our setting is specific in at least three ways.  First, the technology we consider is 
relatively mature.  It is possible that the volume-outcome effects associated with 
transferring volume in settings with more nascent technologies—which are not toward 
the “flat” of the learning curve—might have different effects (either positive or negative) 
on welfare.  In addition, we lack information on the impact of entry on price.  While the 
lack of price information does not pose an obstacle for our analysis—due to the presence 
of a significant amount of administered pricing for CABG—changes in price may play a 
more meaningful role in welfare calculations in other settings. Finally, our study period 
coincides with the introduction of quality reporting for CABG in Pennsylvania (David 
Dranove, et al., 2003).  We do not feel that the presence of these public reports should 
bias our findings, as reporting occurred simultaneously across the entire state while our 
empirical identification exploits the fact that different markets experienced varying levels 
and timing of entry.  If, however, reporting facilitated the differentiation of inputs (e.g.. 
without quality reporting high quality surgeons could not be identified by hospitals), the 
effects of entry we observe may be more muted in markets with less information on 
quality. 
Even with these limitations, we suspect that the pattern underlying our results 
may be general.  Many professions rely on highly- and variably-skilled individuals.   31
Consider, for example, a new firm looking to enter investment banking.  In addition to 
setting up a physical facility, the firm needs to hire or contract with specialized labor (i.e., 
investment bankers).  In the short term, the supply of these factors is relatively inelastic.  
Even in manufacturing—where the supply of production workers may be more elastic—
industry-specific managerial talent may be specialized, and land of appropriate quality 
may be in fixed supply.  As such, examining the welfare implications of entry in other 
markets represents a natural avenue for future research. References 
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Table 1:  Description of Incumbent and Entrant CABG Programs in Pennsylvania 
 
 
Number 
of 
Programs
Annual 
CABGs
Total 
Surgeons*
Average 
Surgeons 
per 
Program 
Average 
Annual 
CABGs per 
Surgeon** 
Average 
Hospital 
RAMR 
Incumbent Programs 
 1994-1995  43 451 203  4.72  95  3.10% 
 2000,  2002-2003  40 349 201  5.03  96  2.17% 
Entrant Programs 
 2000,  2002-2003  23 160 115  4.79  87  2.04% 
 
*Figures include all individuals practicing at a given program type and, thus, may count a surgeon twice if 
he or she splits time across incumbent and entrant programs. 
** Average total number of procedures across all hospitals by surgeons practicing at incumbent and entrant 
hospitals in each period. 
Source: PHC4 CABG Database 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Impact of Entrant Share on the Share of CABG Procedures by Standard- 
and High-Quality Surgeons 
 
 
 
Note: *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Includes 
observations only for the years following the repeal of CON in Pennsylvania (i.e., 2000, 2002, and 2003). 
All models include surgeon-market fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by surgeon 
and market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
β 1: Entrant Share Group
1-10% -0.009 (0.003) ** -0.008 (0.004) ** -0.008 (0.004) ** -0.005 (0.004)
11-20% -0.012 (0.007) * -0.009 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) -0.006 (0.007)
20%+ -0.014 (0.008) * -0.008 (0.008) -0.010 (0.008) -0.004 (0.007)
β 2 : Entrant Share Group * High-Quality Surgeon
1-10% 0.026 (0.010) ** 0.014 (0.008) * 0.013 (0.007) * 0.004 (0.007)
11-20% 0.021 (0.010) ** 0.007 (0.009) 0.009 (0.010) -0.002 (0.010)
20%+ 0.020 (0.013) -0.005 (0.010) 0.005 (0.010) -0.008 (0.010)
β 3 : Entrant Share Group * New Surgeon
1-10% 0.008 (0.005) 0.007 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006)
11-20% 0.018 (0.011) 0.015 (0.012) 0.016 (0.012) 0.011 (0.011)
20%+ 0.019 (0.012) 0.013 (0.013) 0.016 (0.013) 0.010 (0.012)
Year = 2002 -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Year = 2003 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Observations
R-Squared
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 10%
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 20%
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 30%
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 40%
3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836
0.8958
Dependent Variable: Surgeon Market Share
0.8961 0.8961 0.8958 
 
 
Table 3:  Impact of Entrant Share on the Share of CABG Procedures Standard- and 
High-Quality Surgeons Differentiated by Entering Hospital Focus (PTCA vs. 
CABG) 
  
β 1: CABG Focused Entrant Share Group
1-10% -0.009 (0.005) ** -0.008 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007)
11-20% -0.011 (0.007) -0.007 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008) 0.000 (0.006)
20%+ -0.008 (0.006) -0.004 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) 0.003 (0.009)
β 2 : CABG Focused Entrant Share Group * High-Quality Surgeon
1-10% 0.027 (0.011) ** 0.013 (0.009) 0.012 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009)
11-20% 0.020 (0.011) * 0.007 (0.011) 0.007 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011)
20%+ 0.031 (0.015) ** 0.009 (0.011) 0.008 (0.010) 0.000 (0.010)
β 3 : CABG Focused Entrant Share Group * New Surgeon
1-10% 0.018 (0.007) ** 0.017 (0.008) ** 0.016 (0.008) ** 0.013 (0.008)
11-20% 0.022 (0.011) * 0.018 (0.012) 0.018 (0.012) 0.013 (0.011)
20%+ 0.022 (0.010) ** 0.018 (0.011) * 0.018 (0.011) 0.014 (0.010)
β 4 : PTCA Focused Entrant Share Group
1-10% -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)
11-20% -0.002 (0.011) -0.002 (0.012) -0.001 (0.012) -0.002 (0.013)
20%+ -0.011 (0.016) -0.011 (0.016) -0.010 (0.016) -0.016 (0.019)
β 5 : PTCA Focused Entrant Share Group * High-Quality Surgeon
1-10% 0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004)
11-20% 0.006 (0.012) 0.003 (0.013) 0.002 (0.013) 0.003 (0.013)
20%+ 0.015 (0.016) 0.015 (0.016) 0.013 (0.016) 0.021 (0.020)
β 6 : PTCA Focused Entrant Share Group * New Surgeon
1-10% -0.005 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004)
11-20% -0.009 (0.020) -0.009 (0.021) -0.009 (0.021) -0.008 (0.021)
20%+ 0.022 (0.020) 0.021 (0.020) 0.021 (0.020) 0.027 (0.023)
Year = 2002 -0.003 (0.002) * -0.003 (0.002) * -0.003 (0.002) * -0.003 (0.002) *
Year = 2003 -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Observations
R-Squared 0.8655
Dependent Variable: Surgeon Market Share
0.8664 0.8957 0.8957
*,**, and *** denote statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 10%
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 20%
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 30%
High-Quality 
Surgeon=Top 40% 
 
Table 4: Hospitals and Surgeon Operating Below Selected Volume Thresholds 
 
   1994 1995 2000 2002 2003 
Hospitals w/ Annual Volume <200  10 7 15  27  29 
Total Hospitals  43 43 55 62 63 
Share Below Threshold  23% 16% 27% 44% 46% 
       
Surgeons w/ Annual Volume <125  120 114 109 146 147 
Total Surgeons  184 189 182 188 182 
Share Below Threshold  65% 60% 60% 78% 81% 
 
Source: PHC4 CABG database 
 
 
Table 5:  Impact of New Entrant Share on the Likelihood of Seeing an Above-
Threshold Provider 
 
 
Note: *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  Includes 
observations only for the years following the repeal of CON in Pennsylvania (i.e., 2000, 2002, and 2003). 
The following variables are included in the regression but are not shown in the table: age, age
2, calendar 
quarter fixed effects, market fixed effects, indicators for cardiogenic shock, concurrent angioplasty, 
complicated hypertension, dialysis, female gender, heart failure, and prior CABG or valve surgery.   
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by market. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Threshold=200 Threshold=300 Threshold=200
β 1: Entrant Share  -0.002 (0.068) -0.018 (0.022) 0.072 (0.082)
Marginal Effect  0.000 (0.002) -0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.002)
Threshold=150 Threshold=200 Threshold=150
β 1: Entrant Share  0.013 (0.029) -0.049 (0.025) ** 0.026 (0.029)
Marginal Effect  0.002 (0.005) -0.005 (0.002) ** 0.004 (0.004)
Threshold=125 Threshold=150 Threshold=125
β 1: Entrant Share  0.031 (0.024) -0.054 (0.023) ** 0.011 (0.025)
Marginal Effect  0.008 (0.006) -0.001 (0.001) ** 0.003 (0.006)
Threshold=100 Threshold=100 Threshold=100
β 1: Entrant Share  0.050 (0.021) ** 0.000 (0.043) 0.016 (0.015)
Marginal Effect  0.011 (0.005) ** 0.000 (0.000) 0.004 (0.004)
Threshold=75 Threshold=75 Threshold=75
β 1: Entrant Share  0.000 (0.020) -0.019 (0.060) 0.004 (0.013)
Marginal Effect  0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.002)
Observations
Surgeon Volume 
Above Threshold?
Hospital Volume 
Above Threshold?
Surgeon-Hospital 
Volume Above 
Threshold?
37,708 37,708 37,708 
 Figure 1: Number and Market Share of Entrant Programs 
  
Source: PHC4 Hospital Discharge Database 
 
Figure 2: Total CABG Programs in Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey 
 
Source: PHC4, New York State Department of Health, New Jersey Department of Health and Senior 
Services. 
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Figure 3:  Map of Incumbent and Entrant CABG Hospitals in Pennsylvania 
  
Figure 4: Per Capita CABG Utilization in Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey 
 
Source: PHC4, New York State Department of Health, New Jersey Department of Health and Senior 
Services, and U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 
Figure 5: Operating Margin by Entry Status for Pennsylvania Hospitals 
 
Source: Medicare Cost Reports 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
Year
C
A
B
G
s
 
P
e
r
 
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
 
 
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
NJ NY PA
-16%
-14%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
Year
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
 
B
y
 
E
n
t
r
y
 
S
t
a
t
u
s
 
Incumbent Entrant Never Entered